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  This paper looks into the desirability of trade liberalization for 
manufacturers, retailers and consumers. The analysis compares the 
move from the autarky situation to either one of free trade that entails 
a change in the distribution system or not. We also examine whether 
the interests of manufacturers and retailers about the preferred 
distribution system coincide, provided trade opens. We find that 
market integration is beneficial to all agents only under certain 
conditions on the degree of market asymmetry and the degree of 
product differentiation. Interestingly, if integration entails a change in 
the distribution system, the conflict between manufacturers and 
retailers strengthens since only retailers prefer free trade when markets 
are not too asymmetric and when interbrand competition is sufficiently 
strong. Furthermore, consumers can be harmed by trade and, in a 
setting without exclusivities, one country may experience a welfare 
decrease. Finally, the analysis of the strategic choice concerning 
exclusivity clauses uncovers that retailers and manufacturers never 
agree about their preference for endogenous distribution systems. 
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 31 Introduction
Among other things, the so called "new trade theory", which dispenses with the
perfect competition assumption, has provided theoretical support to the existence
of intraindustry trade and can also explain why a large share of international trade
takes place between similar countries. These studies acknowledge increasing returns
and product diﬀerentiation as important determinants of trade. Thus an important
literature, beginning in the 80s, has analyzed the welfare gains from trade under
noncompetitive conditions (Krugman, 1980, Markusen, 1981, Shaked and Sutton,
1984). But whether the opening of trade is proﬁtable to oligopolistic ﬁrms has not
received much attention. This paper takes the analysis one step further and pro-
vides some normative implications about who wins and who loses from free trade.
We examine the gains from trade in an imperfect competition model with demand
asymmetric countries and product diﬀerentiation where vertical relationships are
considered. Once these are at place, diﬀe r e n tm a r k e ts t r u c t u r e st h a tr e s u l ti nd i f -
ferent distribution systems become relevant to the analysis.
In particular, we present a model with two countries (a large and a small one)
in which there is a multiproduct successive monopoly to look into the desirability of
integrating two economies for manufacturers, retailers and consumers. A move to
free trade entails a market expansion eﬀect and a competition eﬀect. The assumed
market structure under autarky is made for the sake of the analysis. Since the
latter eﬀect in the current setting also depends on whether retailers are multiprod-
uct sellers, multiproduction is assumed from scratch to better understand how the
competition eﬀect works. Two distinct questions are addressed. We ﬁrst examine
the incentives that manufacturers and retailers have to support trade liberalization
processes. Since a move from autarky to free trade may entail a change in the dis-
tribution system or not, and each alternative distribution system implies changes on
the agents’ incentives to free trade as well as on welfare, we study their incentives
for two alternative distribution systems: one with exclusivity in distribution and
another one without it. In addition, the welfare changes originated by the open-
ing of trade are also analyzed. Secondly, and once trade occurs, we study whether
exclusivity arrangements are beneﬁcial to the diﬀerent agents involved; that is, we
analyze whether the interests of manufacturers and retailers about the preferred
distribution system coincide, provided trade opens. This is undertaken to further
4clarify the likely conﬂicts between agents in the production process that may arise
in moves to free trade. One may wonder about the endogeneity of the exclusivity
decision. It will be argued below that the introduction of exclusivity arrangements
in equilibrium is sensitive to which agents hold the power to impose them. Conse-
quently, both alternative distribution systems have to be analyzed.
The consideration of which agents in a vertical chain gain and lose from trade is
particularly interesting when evaluating programmes of integration between coun-
tries that are asymmetric in size and for sectors where distribution is a relevant
feature. Although the decision about free trade are taken by governments, e. g.
making use of a given welfare measure, it is relevant to know which type of agent in
an industry sector might beneﬁt from trade because some welfare improving agree-
ments are not sanctioned due to lobbying activities by those who lose. Our analysis
may shed some light as to the implications of ongoing liberalization processes or
agreements. As shall shortly be seen, the possible beneﬁts that accrue to manu-
facturers and retailers depend on the degree of substitutability of products (or how
diﬀerentiated products are perceived by consumers), on whether the ﬁrms are in a
large or a small country, and also on whether there are exclusivity arrangements
between manufacturers and retailers.1
We are interested in ﬁrst examining the incentives that manufacturers and re-
tailers have concerning a move from autarky to free trade. Two alternative distribu-
tion networks, once trade liberalization is achieved, are distinguished depending on
whether intrabrand competition is introduced, i.e. there is competition in the same
product as it is sold by both retailers. Then we examine whether consumers gain
with trade as well as whether the existence of social beneﬁts associated with trade
1As pointed out in Motta et al. (1997), trade liberalization processes between countries with
very diﬀerent characteristics are the rule rather than the exception. These authors emphasize how
important are the initial conditions in determining the persistence of, say, historical advantages
after trade. Another reason suggesting the policy problems that our analysis can help understand
is exempliﬁed by the number of preferential trade agreements - some 250 had been notiﬁed to
the WTO by the year 2002. There is a widespread view that such agreements create obstacles to
multilateral trade liberalization. A recent paper by Saggi (2006) examines these questions and his
work indeed emphasizes the relevance of countries that are symmetric in establishing incentives to
multilateral trade liberalization under diﬀerent preferential trade agreements.
5liberalization. Secondly, we also analyze the distribution networks that would en-
dogenously arise in case that manufacturers or retailers were given the opportunity
to introduce exclusivity relationships. Results are characterized both by the degree
of market asymmetry and the degree of product diﬀerentiation. Our main ﬁndings
can be summarized as follows. Firstly, the opening of trade without a change in
the distribution system results in that both the manufacturer and retailer of the
small country are always better oﬀ. Only if market sizes are not too asymmetric
will all manufacturers and retailers gain with free trade. These ﬁndings are in con-
trast with earlier analyses where vertical relationships have been ignored. Secondly,
trade liberalization with a change in the distribution system results in that only the
retailer of the small country is better oﬀ. It is possible that both manufacturers
and retailers gain with free trade only under certain conditions, i.e. for suﬃciently
small market asymmetry and low enough interbrand competition. Interestingly, the
conﬂict between manufacturers and retailers strengthens since only retailers prefer
free trade when markets are not too asymmetric and when interbrand competition is
suﬃciently strong. Thirdly, consumers in the small country can be harmed by trade
when demand asymmetries are suﬃciently marked. Besides, in a setting without
exclusivity, producer losses can oﬀset consumer gains so that the opening of trade
results in a welfare decrease for the large country. Finally, the analysis of the strate-
gic choice concerning exclusivity clauses uncovers that retailers and manufacturers
never agree about their preference for endogenous distribution systems, in the sense
that if manufacturers are better oﬀ under exclusivity then retailers had better not
and viceversa.
As is well known, in oligopoly models of trade, in contrast with monopolistic
competition and traditional general equilibrium models, it is unclear whether trade
is beneﬁcial in private and social terms. With product homogeneity, Donsimoni
and Gabszewicz (1989), for a class of examples, and Anderson et al. (1989), in a
more general model, have shown that trade liberalization under oligopoly is harmful
for ﬁrms in at least one of the countries.2 On the other hand, Cordella (1993)
2The ﬁnding that ﬁrms may lose with the opening of trade can be contradicted by resorting
to product diﬀerentiation, as in Donsimoni and Gabszewicz (1989), to private cost information, as
in Moner-Colonques (1998), or to endogenous product choice in a dynamic setting, as in Cabrales
and Motta (2001).
6undertakes a welfare analysis to show that the gains to consumers can outweigh
the losses to producers and hence both countries would gain from intraindustry
trade liberalization. Ambiguities in welfare remain in address models of product
diﬀerentiation as the integration of two separate countries typically entails the exit of
ﬁrms. This happens for the horizontal diﬀerentiation case (as proposed by Eaton and
Kierzkowski, 1984), and for the vertical diﬀerentiation case with income disparities
(as in Gabszewicz et al., 1981, and Shaked and Sutton, 1984). Furthermore, with
a representative consumer approach and quantity competition, Motta (1992) has
shown that if ﬁrms have not sunk their quality costs then there are welfare losses
for the small country when the quality gap is not too large. Our paper can be seen
as complementary to the above line of research and it is our purpose to examine
whether ﬁrms, consisting of manufacturers and retailers, and consumers ﬁnd trade
liberalization proﬁtable, modelled here as a move from an autarky to a free trade
situation. Although there exist some references that study vertical relationships in
open economies an analysis like the one herein developed seems not to have been
undertaken.3
T h ep a p e ri so r g a n i z e da sf o l l o w s .T h en e x ts e c t i o ns e t so u tt h em o d e l .D i ﬀerent
subsections characterize the autarky equilibrium, and the free trade equilibrium with
and without exclusivity relationships. Sections three and four analyze the gains
agents may obtain in a move from autarky to free trade. Section ﬁve examines
the endogenous distribution systems that arises once trade liberalization has taken
place. Some concluding remarks close the paper.
2T h e M o d e l
Consider two countries where in each country k, k = A, B demand is obtained from
























3Spencer and Jones (1991, 1992) have analyzed the implications of vertical agreements for
strategic trade policy. Some relevant papers on this topic are those by Spencer and Qiu (2001),
Grossman and Helpman (2002) and Head et al. (2004). Recent contributions by Richardson (2004)
and Raﬀ and Schmitt (2005) study the use of some vertical restraints in international markets.





i , where qk
i denotes the amount
of product i consumed at country k, pk
i denotes the price in country k of product i,
mk is the income of the representative consumer at country k, and Ik is the income
spent in the numeraire good in country k.A l s o ,ak are positive constants, nk are
the total number of products available for consumption in country k and d ∈ (0,1)
is the degree of product diﬀerentiation between products and measures interbrand
competition.
In each country k, there is a manufacturer and a retailer. Both are needed to sell
the products to consumers. Denote by Mk the manufacturer which produces two
diﬀerentiated products at a constant per unit cost, c and by Rk, the retailer who
then sells products to consumers.
Retailer k selling product i pays a per unit of output rate of wik to the manu-
facturer. We limit our analysis to linear contracts. One might be tempted to think
that the results that will follow very much depend on the ineﬃciency caused by
the double marginalization eﬀect. We wish to brieﬂy comment on this assumption.
Firstly, although the superiority of two-part tariﬀ contracts over linear contracts is
usually established given that manufacturers have two instruments at hand, the lat-
ter may become appropriate when there are observability or renegotiation problems
(see Tirole, 1988). Secondly, Shaﬀer (1991), who analyzes a two-product monopolist
who sells to one retailer has shown that the most that can be extracted via the ﬁxed
fee is the corresponding product’s marginal contribution to the retailer’s payoﬀsa n d
that the wholesale price exceeds marginal cost. It can also be shown that his ﬁnding
also applies to a successive duopoly setting with intrabrand competition. Therefore,
the common understanding that a two-part tariﬀ eliminates the double marginaliza-
tion is no longer true when retailers are multiproduct sellers; it is mitigated but not
removed and the consideration of two-part tariﬀ contracts would not signiﬁcantly
change the analysis below given that both under autarky and free trade we assume
that retailers are multiproduct sellers.
We will consider diﬀe r e n tm a r k e tc o n ﬁgurations. i) The initial situation, the
autarky case, where both markets are isolated. In that case each retailer sells only
the two products of the corresponding domestic manufacturer; then nk =2for
k = A,B. The opening of trade creates a common market in which there is only one
industry with two manufacturers and two retailers facing demands consisting of the
sum of demands in each country. Two alternative situations under free trade will be
8distinguished. Firstly, ii) the free trade with exclusivity case, where consumers can
buy products from any retailer and each retailer sells exclusively the two products
of the corresponding domestic manufacturer; then nk =4for k = A,B. Secondly,
iii) the free trade with non-exclusivity case, where consumers can buy products from
any retailer and each retailer sells the products of both t h ed o m e s t i ca n dt h ef o r e i g n
manufacturer, nk =4for k = A,B, and it supposes the presence of intrabrand com-
petition in the four products. As noted above, we are interested in analyzing whether
manufacturers and retailers ﬁnd international competition proﬁtable. Such process
may imply, among other things, a change in retail distribution systems from single
product sellers (before trade occurs) to multiproduct sellers (once trade opens). It
is for the sake of the analysis and to isolate from this eﬀect that multiproduction is
assumed.
2.1 The Autarky Equilibrium
Before trade liberalizes, each country’s home industry is separated from the other’s.
This can be explained by e.g. the existence of a prohibitive tariﬀ.L e t p r o d u c t 1
and product 2 be the two products produced by MA, while those produced by MB
are product 3 and product 4. The inverse demand system under the autarky case
































Under autarky all the production of manufacturers is sold in their country of
origin, and there is a multiproduct successive monopoly in each country. To compute
the autarky equilibrium we solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the following
two stage game. In the ﬁrst stage the manufacturer sets each product’s transfer price;
in the second stage the retailer chooses the amount of output for each product to
be sold to consumers. Finally, consumers make their purchase decisions. Solving
backwards for country A we have that, given the transfer prices (w1A,w 2A) set by


























A =( w1A − c)q
A
1 (w1A,w 2A)+( w2A − c)q
A
2 (w1A,w 2A)
where the equilibrium transfer prices are w∗
1A = w∗
2A = aA+c











1A −c = w∗
2A −c = aA−c
2 ,w h e r et h em a n u -
facturer obtains a higher margin than the retailer and both margins are independent





8(1+d) while equilibrium consumer surplus is CSA∗ =
(aA−c)2
16(1+d)2. Finally, social
welfare is given by, SWA∗ = MA∗ + RA∗ + CSA∗ =
(aA−c)2(7+6d)
16(1+d)2 . Similarly for the
other country. The star superscript denotes the equilibrium variables under autarky.
The multiproduct manufacturer sets up transfer prices that fully internalize market
competition, as the equilibrium transfer price corresponds with that of monopoly.
The multiproduct retailer chooses quantities that internalize competition so that the
market prices are those corresponding to a multiproduct monopolist with constant
marginal costs equal to the equilibrium transfer price.
2.2 The Free Trade Equilibrium with Exclusivity
Now the two countries A and B, are integrated, that is, retailers sell the products
to the two representative consumers and they cannot price discriminate across con-
sumers of diﬀerent countries. Also and since retailers are exclusive, each one sells
only the products of the respective manufacturer. The four equation inverse demand
system for the integrated economy has to be computed. Note that it is just the sum
of the demand of each country k. Then the utility maximization problem for coun-
try k0s consumer results in four linear inverse demands. This four equation demand
system is inverted to obtain qk
i (p1,p 2,p 3,p 4), with i =1 ,2,3,4. Total demand of
product i is then deﬁned by Qi(p1,p 2,p 3,p 4)=qA
i (p1,p 2,p 3,p 4)+qB
i (p1,p 2,p 3,p 4),
for i =1 ,2,3,4. Thus the inverse demand system in the enlarged market is,4
4Since demands are linear with a diﬀerent intercept, the sum has to take into account that
asymmetry, and therefore, it has two branches (see the Appendix). However and for the sake
of the exposition, we only consider in the sequel the branch where consumers of both countries
have positive demand. Once we have solved the model under this assumption, we ensure that the
























B − Q4 − d(Q1 + Q2 + Q3)) (7)
In this case, there is only one market whose market structure consists of a mul-
tiproduct successive duopoly. To compute the free trade equilibrium with exclusive
domestic retailers we solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the following two
stage game. In the ﬁrst stage both manufacturers set simultaneously and indepen-
dently the transfer prices. In the second stage both retailers choose simultaneously
a n di n d e p e n d e n t l yt h ea m o u n to fo u t p u tf o re a c hp r o d u c tt ob es o l dt oc o n s u m e r s .
Finally, consumers make their purchase decisions. Solving backwards we have that,
given the transfer prices (w1A,w 2A,w 3B,w 4B) set by manufacturers in the ﬁrst stage,








B =( p3 − w3B)Q3 +( p4 − w4B)Q4
which yields the following equilibrium quantities:
Q1(w1A,w 2A,w 3B,w 4B)=
(aA+aB)(1−d)−(2+2d−d2)w1A+d(2+d)w2A+d(1−d)(w3B+w4B)
2(1−d)(1+2d)
Q2(w1A,w 2A,w 3B,w 4B)=
(aA+aB)(1−d)−(2+2d−d2)w2A+d(2+d)w1A+d(1−d)(w3B+w4B)
2(1−d)(1+2d)
Q3(w1A,w 2A,w 3B,w 4B)=
(aA+aB)(1−d)−(2+2d−d2)w3B+d(2+d)w4B+d(1−d)(w1A+w2A)
2(1−d)(1+2d)
Q4(w1A,w 2A,w 3B,w 4B)=
(aA+aB)(1−d)−(2+2d−d2)w4B+d(2+d)w3B+d(1−d)(w1A+w2B)
2(1−d)(1+2d)
As expected, each quantity is decreasing with its own transfer price and increas-
i n gw i t ht h eo t h e r s .H o w e v e r ,i tm u s tb en o t ed that the increase due to the transfer
price of the other product sold by the retailer is greater than the increase due to
below the smallest inverse demand intercept . This will be referred to as the technical threshold
on a = aA
aB in the sequel. In fact we are just focusing on the case where the sizes of both markets
are not too diﬀerent such that ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal to sell in both countries.
11transfer prices of products sold by the rival retailer. This is explained by the inter-
nalization of competition by a multiproduct retailer. Then, manufacturers MA and








B =( w3B − c)Q3(w1A,w 2A,w 3B,w 4B)+( w4B − c)Q4(w1A,w 2A,w 3B,w 4B)







2(2+d)(1+2d) , for i =1 ,2,3,4, and k = A,B, respectively. Superscript







ik − c =
(aA+aB−2c)
2(2+d) for i =1 ,2,3,4 and k = A,B.
It is worth noting that both margins are decreasing with d and, in absolute
terms, the manufacturers’ margins vary at a higher rate than the retailers’ margins.






(aA + aB − 2c)2(1 + d)







(aA + aB − 2c)2(1 + d)3




(2 + 3d)((aA − c)(5 + 14d +7 d2) − (aB − c)(3 + 6d + d2))2




(2 + 3d)(−(aA − c)(3 + 6d + d2)+( aB − c)(5 + 14d +7 d2))2
16(2 + d)2(1 + 2d)2(1 + 3d)2
Note that each country’s social welfare is deﬁned as the sum of ﬁrms’ proﬁts and
consumer surplus and denoted by (SWk)FTE k = A,B. Finally, aggregate social
welfare is the sum of both countries’ welfare SWFTE =( SWA)FTE+( SWB)FTE.
5In order to compute the consumer surplus for market i, note that the equillibrium market
price, pFTE
i , determines which is the output consumed in each country. In particular, (qA
i )FTE
is the quantity that solves pFTE
i = aA − (1 + 3d)(qA




i )FTE +( qB
i )FTE and we have made use of the equality (qA
i )FTE =( qA
j )FTE for all
i,j =1 ,2,3,4.O n c e (qA
i )FTE and (qB
i )FTE are obtained, the consumer surplus is computed in
the usual manner.
122.3 The Free Trade Equilibrium with Non-Exclusivity
We now consider that the two countries are integrated as in the above scenario but
assume that there is a new distribution scheme. Retailers are no longer exclusive;
now both retailers sell the four products, two from the domestic manufacturer plus
two from the foreign one. Demand in the integrated economy is computed as before,
but now we must take into account that each product is sold by two retailers, which
means that there is intrabrand competition. Thus the inverse demand system is
given by (4)-(7), where now Qi = qiA + qiB,i=1 ,2,3,4, where qik is the amount
of product i sold by retailer k, for i =1 ,2,3,4, and k = A,B.6 As above, there
is only one market whose market structure consists of a multiproduct successive
duopoly. To compute the free trade equilibrium with non-exclusivity we solve for
the subgame perfect equilibrium of the following two stage game. In the ﬁrst stage
both manufacturers set simultaneously and independently the transfer prices, where
each manufacturer sets two transfer prices for its two products sold at two diﬀerent
outlets. In the second stage both retailers choose simultaneously and independently
the amount of output for each product to be sold to consumers, where now retailers
choose four quantities. Finally consumers make their purchase decisions. Solving
b a c k w a r d sw eh a v et h a t ,g i v e nt h et r a n s f e rp r i c e s(w1,w 2,w 3,w 4) set by manufac-















where the solution is given by:
qik(w1,w 2,w 3,w 4)=
(aA + aB)(1 − d) − 2(1 + 2d)wi +2 d
P
j6=i wj
3(1 − d)(1 + 3d)
,i , j=1 ,2,3,4; k = A, B.
6Note that under free trade with exclusivity Q1 was sold solely by retailer A. Thus q1B was
nil. Similarly for Q2. The present setting requires further notation to identify the amount of each
product sold by each retailer.
7We can save on notation given that manufacturers do not set diﬀerent transfer prices to sym-
metric retailers.




A =( w1 − c)(q1A(w1,w 2,w 3,w 4)+q1B(w1,w 2,w 3,w 4))




B =( w3 − c)(q3A(w1,w 2,w 3,w 4)+q3B(w1,w 2,w 3,w 4))
+(w4 − c)(q4A(w1,w 2,w 3,w 4)+q4B(w1,w 2,w 3,w 4))
where the equilibrium transfer prices are wFTN
i =
(aA+aB)(1−d)+2(1+d)c




6(1+3d) , for i =1 ,2,3,4, and k = A,B. Superscript FTN
stands for free trade with non-exclusivity. Given these equilibrium values, it is easy






i − c =
(aA+aB−2c)(1−d)
4 ; for i =1 ,2,3,4.
Contrary to what happens in the absence of intrabrand competition, the retailers’
margins can exceed those of the manufacturers when competition is strong (i.e.
for d>1
2). In this case, the retailers’ margins are increasing with d while those
for manufacturers are decreasing with d. This is explained by the diﬀerent way in
which pFTN
i and wFTN
i decrease as d varies. It must be noted that prices decrease
less than transfer prices and then the retailers’ margins increase with d. Retailers
are capable of better internalizing the competition between the four products as
compared with manufacturers, who can only internalize competition between their
own two products. Further note that the presence of intrabrand competition pushes
both the manufacturers’ and the retailers’ margins down as compared with the
equilibrium under free trade with exclusivity. Equilibrium proﬁts, consumer surplus


















((4 + d)(aA − c) − (2 − d)(aB − c))2




(−(2 − d)(aA − c)+( 4+d)(aB − c))2
18(1 + 3d)2
As before, each country’s social welfare is deﬁned as the sum of ﬁrms’ proﬁts
and consumer surplus in each country and denoted by (SWk)FTN k = A,B.
143P r i v a t e I n c e n t i v e s t o F r e e T r a d e
3.1 The Case with Exclusivity
In this section we analyze the conditions under which the agents gain in the move
from autarky to free trade provided that the distribution system is exclusive. In
other words we analyze the agents’ incentives for trade liberalization.
Manufacturers’ gains from free trade.
Both manufacturers will prefer free trade rather than autarky as long as (MA)FTE >
MA∗ and (MB)FTE >M B∗. The ﬁrst inequality, for c =0 , yields
4aAaB(1 + d)2 − (aA)2(2 + d(8 + d(7 + 2d))) + (aB)22(1 + d)2
4(1 + d)(2 + d)2(1 + 2d)
> 0
The denominator is positive. For the sake of the exposition and without loss of
generality assume that aB ≥ aA. That is, the inverse demand intercept for coun-
try B is not lower than that of country A; put diﬀerently, country B consumer’s
maximum willingness to pay is not lower than that of country A one’s. Through-
out the paper we will refer to country A as the small country and to country B
as the large country. Let us deﬁne the ratio aA/aB ≡ a as the relative market
size ratio, where a ∈ (0,1].I n c a s e o f a =1we will refer to the symmetric
markets case. As a approaches zero the market asymmetry across countries in-
creases. We now divide the numerator by (aB)2 to obtain the following concave
polynomial in a :4 a(1 + d)2 − a2(2 + d(8 + d(7 + 2d))) + 2(1 + d)2. The coeﬃcient









A(d) are the roots of the above concave polynomial. It can
be checked that f
−
A(d) always takes on negative values and that f
+
A(d) is always
greater than one for d ∈ (0,1). See Appendix 2 for the precise expressions of these
roots. Then we can conclude that the manufacturer of the small country always









B(d) are the roots of the following convex
polynomial, 2(1 + d)2a2 +4 ( 1+d)2a − (2 + d(8 + d(7 + 2d))). It can be checked
that f
−
B(d) always takes on negative values and that f
+
B(d) lies between zero and
one for d ∈ (0,1). Thus, 0 <f
+
B(d) < 1 <f
+
A(d), and we conclude that as long as
a ∈ (f
+
B(d),1) both manufacturers are better oﬀ with free trade. Put diﬀerently,
both manufacturers gain in the move to free trade for suﬃciently low market asym-
15metry, regardless of the degree of interbrand competition. Also and since f
+
B(d)
is increasing with d, the higher the interbrand competition the lower the degree of
market asymmetry compatible with both manufacturers beneﬁting from free trade.
Retailers’ gains from free trade.
By the same token, both retailers will prefer free trade rather than autarky as





where it happens that 0 <g
+
B(d) < 1 <g
+
A(d), for all d ∈ (0,1). Then, we conclude
that the retailer of the small country always gains with free trade, while the one
from the large country only gains for suﬃciently low market asymmetry, regardless
of the degree of interbrand competition. The root g
+
B(d) is increasing with d and
t h es a m ec o n c l u s i o na sf o rm a n u f a c t u r e r si sr e a c h e d .
Combining the manufacturers and retailers’ points of view, ﬁr s tn o t et h a tt h e








A(d), for d ∈ (0,1).
This ranking shows that the agents in the small country always gain with free trade,
and that the retailer in the large country will beneﬁt from free trade for a wider
range of market asymmetry than that corresponding to the manufacturer. The next
proposition summarizes the results (see Appendix 2 for the complete characterization
of the agents’ incentives to trade liberalization).
Proposition 1 The manufacturer and retailer of the small country are always bet-
ter oﬀ with free trade. Besides, if market sizes are not too asymmetric then all
manufacturers and retailers are better oﬀ with free trade.
Depending on the agents’ incentives to trade liberalization, three diﬀerent regions
above the dashed line8 may be identiﬁed in Figure 1: region a,w h e r eb o t hm a n u f a c -
turers and both retailers beneﬁt from free trade; region b, where all agents except
the large country manufacturer beneﬁt, and region c, where only the manufacturer
and retailer from the small country beneﬁt from trade liberalization.
Note that the case where both countries are identical corresponds with the upper
s i d eo ft h es q u a r ea n dt h a tas u ﬃcient condition for all agents to beneﬁtf r o mt h e
opening of trade is precisely market symmetry. Alternatively, for a given level of
8Note that as explained in the Appendix, there is a technical bound on the level of market size
asymmetry that ensures that equilibrium price is on the lower branch of the inverse demand. The
bound amounts to a>ΦE(d)= 3+6d+d2
5+14d+7d2, the dashed line in Figure 1.
16Figure 1: Autarky vs. Free Trade with Exclusivity.
product diﬀerentiation, as long as market asymmetry increases, ﬁrst the manufac-
turer and next the retailer of the large country does not beneﬁt from free trade. The
results obtained in a setting with vertical relationships are in sharp contrast with
previous work by Donsimoni and Gabszewicz (1989) and Anderson et al. (1989),
who show that, for the case of complete symmetry, all ﬁrms must lose.
In fact, were the market served by manufacturers who sell directly to consumers,
our model would yield that it is not always the case that, with market symmetry,
both manufacturers end up better oﬀ.I np a r t i c u l a r ,w eﬁnd that both manufacturers
are better oﬀ with international free trade competition only when products are
suﬃciently diﬀerentiated (d<0.707); otherwise both are worse oﬀ .W h e nm a r k e t s
sizes are not equal, we ﬁnd that both manufacturers gain with free trade if product
diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently high and markets are not too asymmetric. If d<0.707
and as markets become too asymmetric then the large country manufacturer will be
worse oﬀ w i t ham o v et of r e et r a d e .
Therefore, the comparison of a setting with and without retailers unveils the
relevance of vertical separation with exclusive retailers: trade liberalization beneﬁts
all the ﬁrms in situations (i.e. for little product diﬀerentiation) that are not beneﬁcial
to manufacturers in both countries when retailers are not employed. The presence
17of vertical relationships makes it more likely that free trade be favourable to all ﬁrms
involved.
To illustrate the intuition behind the foregoing analysis note that a move from
autarky to free trade entails, in general, two opposite eﬀects. On the one hand, there
is a market expansion eﬀect provided that manufacturers and retailers operate in a
larger market. On the other hand, they face competition from agents in the other
country. The former eﬀect depends on the relative market sizes; one expects that
agents in the small country will prefer the opening of trade. However, the latter
eﬀect is determined by market structure, by features such as the degree of product
diﬀerentiation, the vertical distribution structure and the existence of intrabrand
and in-store competition.
As it turns out, the market expansion eﬀect always dominates the competition
eﬀect for the manufacturer and the retailer in the small country. On the one hand, it
happens that equilibrium output always increases in the move from autarky to free
trade with exclusivity. On the other, both the retailer’s and the manufacturer’s mar-
gins may increase or decrease depending on how important is market asymmetry.9
However, the overall eﬀe c ti st h a tt h ea g e n t si nt h es m a l lc o u n t r ya l w a y sp r e f e rf r e e
trade. Concerning the large country, the market expansion eﬀect is greater the closer
a is to unity; the competition eﬀect is greater the less diﬀerentiated products are,
that is, the closer d is to unity. As to the change in equilibrium margins and output,
it must be noted that both margins are always higher under free trade whereas the
variation in equilibrium output depends on market asymmetry.10 Broadly speak-
ing, the market expansion eﬀect oﬀsets the competition eﬀect when markets are not
too asymmetric for any given degree of product diﬀerentiation; the range of market
asymmetry for which this happens is wider the softer the competition intensity. Fur-
ther note that the competition eﬀect aﬀects in a diﬀerent way the manufacturer’s
and the retailer’s incentives to free trade. Speciﬁcally, the retailer’s incentives are
greater than the manufacturer’s, for any given pair a and d. As equilibrium outputs
are the same for manufacturer and retailer, the diﬀerent incentives are explained by
the diﬀerence in their respective margins. The retailer’s margin decreases by less
than the manufacturer’s margin with more competition.
9Speciﬁcally, the manufacturer’s margin is smaller under free trade if a> 1
1+d; while that of
the retailer is smaller if a>
(1+d)2
(1+3d+d2).
10Speciﬁcally, equilibrium output under free trade exceeds that under autarky if a> d
2(1+d)2.
183.2 The Case with Non-Exclusivity
Manufacturers’ gains from free trade.
Proceeding in the same way as above, both manufacturers will prefer free trade
rather than autarky as long as (MA)FTN >M A∗ and (MB)FTN >M B∗. This holds








A(d) are positive, ii) s
+
A(d ) < 1
for d>0.589, iii) s
+





intersect at d =0 .589. Then the following result can be stated: Both manufacturers
are worse oﬀ iﬀ d>0.589 and a ∈ (s
+
A(d),1).T h i s never happens when trade
liberalization does not entail any changes in the distribution system.
Retailers’ gains from free trade.
It will be the case that both retailers prefer free trade rather than autarky as





can be checked that 0 <t
+
B(d) < 1 <t
+
A(d),f o ra l ld ∈ (0,1). Then, we conclude
that the retailer of the small country always gains with free trade, while the one in
the large country only gains for suﬃciently low market asymmetry, regardless of the
degree of interbrand competition.
In order to analyze the interests of the four agents, note that the ranking for the
four thresholds is a function of d as follows:



























The next proposition summarizes the results, which are in sharp contrast with
the analysis when trade liberalization does not suppose a change in the distribution
system.
Proposition 2 Only the retailer of the small country is always better oﬀ with free
trade. Besides, the four agents are better oﬀ with free trade when market sizes are
not too asymmetric and when interbrand competition is not too intense. There are
free trade gains only to retailers when markets are not too asymmetric and when
interbrand competition is suﬃciently strong.
The complete characterization for the four ﬁrms’ incentives to trade liberalization
with non-exclusivity is in the Appendix a n da r ed i s p l a y e di nF i g u r e2 .A p a r tf r o m
19Figure 2: Autarky vs. Free Trade with Non-Exclusivity.
diﬀerences in the size of regions, there are now two additional regions above the
dashed line:11
region a, where both manufacturers and both retailers beneﬁt from free trade;
region b,w h e r et h eﬁrms of the small country together with the retailer of the
large country are better oﬀ with trade liberalization;
region c,w h e r eo n l yt h eﬁrms of the small country beneﬁt from trade liberaliza-
tion.
region d, where the ﬁrms of the small country together with the manufacturer
of the large country beneﬁt from free trade; and
region e, where only both retailers beneﬁt from the opening of trade.
Suppose market symmetry, a =1 . The introduction of intrabrand competition in
a move to free trade imposes an upper bound on the degree of product diﬀerentiation
such that, for d>0.589 it is only the retailers who beneﬁtf r o mt r a d ed e s p i t et h ef a c t
that each manufacturer’s products are now sold through two retailers. This ﬁnding
is particularly relevant because the desirability of free trade is not necessarily linked
to a country’s interests but rather to the position the agents have in a distribution
channel. Therefore, a change in the distribution system allows us to recover the
11The expresion for the dashed line is ΦN(d)=2−d
4+d.
20result when retailers are not employed, i.e. the possibility that both manufacturers
do not ﬁnd free trade proﬁtable (yellow region). Putting together the comparison
in the last two sections, we conclude that vertical relations by themselves do not
necessarily make trade liberalization more likely to be favourable to everybody.
As the intensity of competition weakens all the agents’ incentives are aligned in
favour of the opening of trade. Figure 2 discloses that these are possible even for
market asymmetry (grey region). Note now that, for intermediate levels of product
diﬀerentiation, it is the manufacturer from the large country the one who is better
oﬀ under autarky. Indeed one can ﬁnd values of market asymmetry - a<0.443
a n da b o v et h ed a s h e dl i n e-w h e r ei ti simpossible that all the agents simultaneously
beneﬁt from a move to free trade, regardl e s so ft h ed e g r e eo fp r o d u c td i ﬀerentiation.
Finally, and in contrast with the comparison in the previous section, the retailer’s
incentives are greater than the manufacturer’s in the large country only if d exceeds
0.2. Consequently, there appears an additional region, the green one, where it is the
retailer in the large country the sole agent who ﬁnds free trade unproﬁtable.
A closer look at the variation in equilibrium quantities discloses that these are
greater than under autarky. Furthermore, the equilibrium margin for the retailer in
the small country is higher than under autarky only under some circumstances.12
Altogether we have that the latter agent always improves with trade liberalization
this meaning that the market expansion eﬀect always compensates for the compe-
tition eﬀect. Regarding the equilibrium margin for the manufacturer in the large
country, it can be shown that it is smaller than under autarky. Whether the (posi-
tive) variation in output exceeds the (negative) variation in the margin determines
whether the market expansion eﬀect oﬀsets the competition eﬀect. Whatever hap-
pens to the remaining equilibrium margins is unclear. A similar but more elaborate
argument applies to the possible gains enjoyed by the manufacturer in the small
country and to the retailer in the large country.13 It is the reassignment of the dif-
ferent equilibrium margins that gives rise to all the situations illustrated by Figure
2.
12The equilibrium margin is higher under free trade for a<1−d
2−d.
13To be more precise, the equilibrium margin for the manufacturer in the small country is higher
under autarky for a>1−d
1+d. On the other hand, the equilibrium margin for the retailer in the large
country is higher under autarky for a<2−d
1+d.
214W e l f a r e A n a l y s i s
It is common in theoretical work to ﬁnd support to the existence of gains from
free trade. On aggregate, it can be shown that, in the current setting, free trade
improves upon autarky regardless of the distribution system. However, and given
the relevance of the resulting distribution system when trade opens, it also happens
that the welfare comparison under free trade with and without exclusivity gives rise
to an ambiguous ranking and, on aggregate terms, the integrated economy might
gain with the existence of exclusivities.14 This happens for a suﬃciently low degree
of product diﬀerentiation and for any level of demand asymmetry. In the light of
these results it is apparent that a deeper analysis that looks at welfare on a country
basis as well as the impact of trade on consumers is required.
Countries’ policy choices can be justiﬁed in terms of a social welfare analysis
or be driven by their interests in consumers. We begin ﬁrst with examining the
gains from trade liberalization that consumers in each country obtain depending on
which distribution system materializes (See Figure 3). The following proposition
summarizes the main conclusions. See Appendix sections A.2.2 and A.3.2 for the
proof.
Proposition 3 Consumers in the two countries prefer free trade rather than autarky
regardless of the distribution system if the degree of market asymmetry is not too
important (region a). However, as the degree of market asymmetry increases then
consumers in one country will be worse oﬀ if the actual distribution system is the
one with exclusivity (region b). Finally when it is suﬃciently large then consumers
in one country will be worse oﬀ regardless of the distribution system (region c).
With homogeneous products, it is the case that consumers are always better oﬀ
when trade opens (see Cordella, 1993). With product diﬀerentiation though, trade
can reduce the variety of products in the long run and some consumers can be hurt
by the opening of trade, as suggested by Eaton and Kierzkowski (1984).
The short-run analysis herein contemplates vertical relationships to show that
free trade is not necessarily desirable for consumers in both countries. As is well
known, consumer surplus is given by the triangle area below the linear demand curve
and above the price. When comparing with the autarky equilibrium, the height of
14These computations and formal proofs are available from the authors upon request.
22Figure 3: Consumer Surplus for the Small Country: Autarky vs. Free Trade with
and without Exclusivity.
the triangle has to do with the outward/inward demand shift as well as with the price
associated with the equilibrium under free trade, and the base with the equilibrium
quantity. (How consumer surplus is calculated has been advanced in footnote 5)
Note that the opening of trade is aﬀecting consumers welfare is several respects.
F i r s to fa l lt h e r ei sm o r ep r o d u c tv a r i e t yb e c a u s ew i t hf r e et r a d ef o u rd i ﬀerentiated
goods are sold in each country. Next, it is important to stress that the opening
of trade may imply an inward demand shift. Finally, it can also happen that the
equilibrium price under free trade be higher than the equilibrium price under autarky
- which may happen for the small country. The interplay between these three eﬀects
determines whether consumers in the small country might lose from trade. Consider
f o re x a m p l et h ec a s ew i t he x c l u s i v i t i e s .I th a p p e n st h a td e p e n d i n go nt h ed e g r e eo f
demand asymmetry there is a shift outwards in the demand and simultaneously and
increase in price with respect to autarky. If the degree of demand asymmetry is more
pronounced then the price eﬀect dominates the shift eﬀect. As spelled out above,
equilibrium output under free trade not always exceeds that before trade opens.
The combination of these competing eﬀects may result in a reduction of consumer
23surplus.15 The next Proposition addresses what happens in welfare terms. See
Appendix sections A.2.3 and A.3.3 for the proof
Proposition 4 The small country is always better oﬀ in a move from autarky
to free trade regardless of the resulting distribution system. However, the large
country may not support trade liberalization when the distribution system does not
entail exclusivity and product diﬀerentiation is low enough combined with a suﬃ-
ciently large demand asymmetry. That is, (SWk)FTE > (SWk)∗ for k = A,B;
(SWA)FTN > (SWA)∗ but (SWB)FTN R (SWB)∗.
The welfare analysis in Cordella (1993) discloses the relevance both of market and
oligopoly sizes in determining trade liberalization welfare gains. Although ﬁrms in
one country lose from trade, consumer gains can oﬀset producer losses the larger the
market of the trading partner and the less concentrated its industry is. A setting
with vertical relationships conﬁrms the idea that the small country always gets
better with the opening of trade. Consider a distribution system with exclusivities.
It is worth noting that, for the small country, such welfare increase occurs despite
the fact that consumers might lose - as shown in Proposition 3 above. However,
for the large country, ﬁrms may lose and yet welfare increases arise. Interestingly
enough, and exclusivities aside, when competition is intense and countries are enough
asymmetric, the manufacturer’s losses more than compensate consumer and the
retailer’s gains so that welfare is indeed higher without trade - see Figure 4, dark
area.
5 Trade Liberalization and Endogenous Distribu-
tion Systems
The foregoing analysis uncovers not only the conﬂi c tt h a tm a ya r i s eb e t w e e na g e n t s
within the same country but also between agents in both countries at diﬀerent stages
in the production process. This section addresses whether, given that trade liberal-
ization takes place, manufacturers and/or retailers prefer a distribution system that
15This analysis is also applicable to the case without exclusivities with the same conclusion.
However, it is possible to ﬁnd situations where consumer surplus decreases because the price is
higher under free trade and there is a shift inwards in the demand. This additional case shows up
w h e nt h ed e g r e eo fp r o d u c td i ﬀerentiation is not important.
24Figure 4: Welfare for the Large Country: Autarky vs. Free Trade with Non-
Exclusivity.
involves exclusivity relationships. We begin by comparing equilibrium proﬁts for
manufacturers and retailers under an exclusive and a non-exclusivity arrangements.
Then we move on and contemplate the possibility that the products of one of the
manufacturers be sold through only one retailer whereas the rival manufacturer’s
products be sold through both retailers. The consideration of the latter distribution
system will allow us to endogenize the choice of distribution system by assuming an
initial stage where manufacturers, alternatively retailers, decide on the introduction
of an exclusivity clause. In other words, countries abandon the use of any trade
policy and we wish to examine the agents’ incentives to employ a vertical restraint
as is exclusivity. Thus, this part of our analysis keeps a relation with the ideas
d e v e l o p e di nR i c h a r d s o n( 2 0 0 4 )a n dR a ﬀ and Schmitt (2005).16
16Raﬀ and Schmitt (2005), in a setting where contract choice is endogenous, show that trade
liberalization may lead manufacturers to employ vertical restraints thus creating a case for com-
petition policy in an environment with free trade. A similar result is shown by Richardson (2004)
but in a spatial model where the number of retailers is endogenously determined.
25Free Trade with Exclusivity vs. Nonexclusivity.
Note that (Mk)FTE > (Mk)FTN if d>0.342, while (Rk)FTE > (Rk)FTN if
d<0.112. This further emphasizes the conﬂicting interests of manufacturers and
retailers. Consumers are always better oﬀ when retailers are not exclusive. Consid-
ering the aggregate proﬁts of manufacturers and retailers in each country, free trade
with exclusivity reaches higher proﬁts if d>0.756. Considering each country’s social
welfare, free trade without exclusivity achieves greater welfare than with exclusivity.
Endogenous Distribution System when Manufacturers May Impose the Exclusiv-
ity Clause.
For the sake of the exposition, a change in notation is introduced in order to
stress the agents’ decision on exclusivity. Denote by (Mk)lm the equilibrium prof-
its of manufacturer k where the ﬁrst superscript indicates whether manufacturer
A establishes the exclusivity clause and the second corresponds with the choice of
manufacturer B, l,m = E,N,f o rE standing for exclusivity and N for nonexclusiv-
ity. Therefore, (Mk)FTE =( Mk)EE and (Mk)FTN =( Mk)NN. Consider now that
for example MA introduces an exclusive distribution clause on its products while
MB does not. Under this situation we have that retailer RA is the exclusive seller of
MA0s products and distributes the four products in the market. However, retailer
RB only distributes the products of MB. The solution of the two-stage subgame
(ﬁr s tc h o i c eo fw0s and then quantities) under this asymmetric distribution system






There is now an initial stage where manufacturers decide simultaneously and in-
dependently whether to introduce the exclusivity clause. It can be shown that
(MA)EE > (MA)EN, (MA)NN > (MA)EN and that (MB)NN < (MB)EN for all
d ∈ (0,1). However, (MB)EE > (MB)EN if and only if d>0.518. Given symmetry,
it happens that (MA)EN =( MB)NE and that (MB)EN =( MA)NE. In view of this,
it is easy to see that the best response for each manufacturer, if the other intro-
duces exclusivity, is to introduce exclusivity if and only if d>0.518.A l s o ,t h eb e s t
response for each manufacturer if the other does not introduce exclusivity is not to
introduce exclusivity, since (MA)NN > (MA)EN. Then, we have the following result:
26Proposition 5 Suppose manufacturers decide whether to introduce an exclusive dis-
tribution clause. The equilibrium distribution systems are:
i) Both manufacturers do not use exclusive clauses when 0 <d<0.518.
ii) Either both manufacturers use exclusive clauses or both do not when 0.518 <d<
1.
Endogenous Distribution System when Retailers Impose the Exclusivity Clause.
Suppose now that in the initial stage retailers decide simultaneously and in-
dependently whether to introduce the exclusivity clause. Under the asymmetric







By employing the same obvious notation as above, we ﬁnd that (RA)EE < (RA)EN
and (RA)NN < (RA)EN and (RB)NN > (RB)EN for all d ∈ (0,1). However, (RB)EE >
(RB)EN if and only if d<0.439. It is straightforward to characterize the Nash equi-
librium in the choice of exclusivity by retailers.
Proposition 6 Suppose retailers decide whether to introduce an exclusive distribu-
tion clause. The equilibrium distribution systems are:
i) Both retailers use exclusive clauses when 0 <d<0.439.
ii) One retailer uses the exclusive clause and the rival does not when 0.439 <d<1.
Given that trade liberalization occurs, the statements in the above two proposi-
tions leads us to conclude that retailers and manufacturers never agree about their
preference for endogenous distribution systems. Note that a prisoner’s dilemma
shows up since manufacturers prefer to introduce the exclusivity clause yet the Nash
equilibrium is not to introduce it. Speciﬁcally this occurs for 0.342 <d<0.518.
Similarly for retailers in that they prefer not to introduce the exclusivity clause
while the Nash equilibrium is to introduce it; this occurs for 0.112 <d<0.439. An
interesting by-product of the foregoing analysis is that there is a parameter region
for which, although countries refuse to use any trade policy instruments, the agents
do not necessarily ﬁnd it proﬁtable to use vertical restraints such as exclusivity.
276C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper has looked at the desirability of trade liberalization in a setting that
explicitly considers vertical relationships and studied their distributive eﬀects un-
der diﬀerent market structures. The departing situation is one of autarky with a
multiproduct successive monopoly. The opening of trade involves a multiproduct
successive duopoly structure allowing for the introduction of intrabrand competi-
tion. The analysis unveils that not only a conﬂict may arise between agents within
the same country but also between agents in both countries at diﬀerent stages in the
production process. We hope to have shed some light on the derived eﬀects of trade
liberalization suggesting that one should evaluate the process not just on a country
basis but rather look at the agents’ incentives, regardless of the country they belong
to.
Conﬂicts between diﬀe r e n ta g e n t si n v o l v e di nt h ep r o d u c t i o np r o c e s si na no p e n
economy are exempliﬁed by the recent expiration of the World Trade Organisation’s
longstanding system of textile quotas.17 The European Commission was rushing
in shaping an agreement that may please manufacturers, retailers and the Chinese.
Clearly, the battle over Chinese textile trade has set manufacturers against retailers
and consumers. Of course, China’s textile is probably an example that does not
ﬁt exactly into the model but can serve as an illustration. This is a necessary
step to better identify the forces behind the likely damages to some agents in trade
liberalization processes and hence to understanding why they might be contrary to
such processes.
Our analysis has assumed that retailers compete in quantities. One wonders
whether similar results would obtain under price competition. Such an assumption
would imply a reinforcement of the competition eﬀect stemming from a process of
trade liberalization. This would reduce the agents’ incentives towards trade liberal-
17In this way, "China has been heading for a showdown with America and the European Union,
where powerful textile lobbies have frantically agitated for legislative action to stop the ﬂood of
cheap Chinese apparel from swamping their businesses. The EU tried to resolve the issue in June,
when it signed an agreement with China imposing new quotas on ten categories of textile goods,
limiting growth in those categories to between 8% and 12.5% a year. The agreement, which runs to
2007, was to give domestic manufacturers time to adjust to a world of unfettered competition" (The
Economist, "Europe’s textile war with China–and itself", Sep 1st 2005). It seems that European
retailers’ opinion has been disregarded and, just a month after the deal was agreed, quotas on
Chinese textiles have been exceeded.
28ization and increase the incentives to introduce exclusivity clauses. An alternative
modeling could have considered that the departing situation was one with trade
under non-prohibitive tariﬀs. Trade liberalization would imply the elimination of
tariﬀs. One would expect that our results will remain valid for a suﬃcient high level
of tariﬀ protection.
29A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of the inverse demand functions for the in-
tegrated markets case
Note that in the integrated markets case there is only one price for each product in
both countries. Each representative consumer maximizes its utility function subject
to its income constraint for any given vector price (p1,p 2,p 3,p 4).T h ei n v e r s ed e m a n d
function system for each representative consumer reads:









j i,j =1 ,2,3,4 for consumer in country B. Considering the case
where aA ≤ aB, it happens that the aggregate inverse demand for product i,g i v e n
P
j6=i Qj, where Qi = qA
i + qB






j6=i Qj if pi >a A
1
2(aA + aB − Qi − d
P
j6=i Qj) if pi ≤ aA
The upper branch corresponds to the case where the large market is so preva-
lent that the ﬁrms prefer to concentrate on this market by setting a price that is
above the highest price the consumers in the small country are willing to pay. The
second branch is just the case where the countries are not too asymmetric and then
consumers of both countries have positive demand.
A.2 Autarky vs. Free Trade with Exclusivity: Notation and
Complete Characterization of the Agents’ Incentives to
Trade Liberalization
First of all note that there is a constraint on the ratio a in order to guarantee
that the equilibrium for the integrated markets case is on the lower branch of the
aggregate inverse demand function. This constraint comes from pFTE
i ≤ aA since
0 <a A ≤ aB. It reads ΦE(d) ≤ a ≤ 1, where ΦE(d) is equal to 3+6d+d2
5+14d+7d2 and is a
decreasing function of d ranging from 3
5 to 5
26.
A.2.1 Firms’ Gains from Free Trade
1.a) (MA)FTE >M A∗ implies that the small country manufacturer beneﬁts from
free trade. (MA)FTE >M A∗ iﬀ 2(1+d)2 +4 (1+d)2a−(2+8d+7d2 +2d3)a2 > 0,
30where a =
aA
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and verify that f
−
A(d) < 0 < 1 <f
+
A(d) for all d ∈ (0,1).
• Then (MA)FTE >M A∗ iﬀ a ∈ (0,1)





B(d) the lower and the greater roots of the above convex














and satisfy that f
−
B(d) < 0 <f
+
B(d) < 1 for all d ∈ (0,1).
• Then (MB)FTE >M B∗ iﬀ a ∈ (f
+
B(d),1)
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and verify that g
−
A(d) < 0 < 1 <g
+
A(d) for all d ∈ (0,1).
• Then (RA)FTE >R A∗ iﬀ a ∈ (0,1)
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and verify that g
−
B(d) < 0 <g
+
B(d) < 1 for all d ∈ (0,1).
• Then (RB)FTE >R B∗ iﬀ a ∈ (g
+
B(d),1).




B(d) > 0 for all d ∈ (0,1), then the following




B(d) < 1 for all d ∈ (0,1).
By combining the ﬁve items above we have the following result:
31Proposition 7 For all d ∈ (0,1) :




B(d) < 1 then only the agents of the small country beneﬁt
from free trade;




B(d) < 1 then the manufacturer of the large country is the
unique agent not beneﬁting from free trade;




B(d) <a<1 then all agents (manufacturers and retailers)
beneﬁt from free trade.
The above result is qualiﬁed by the constraint on a such that ΦE(d) ≤ a ≤ 1.
The constraint corresponds with the dashed line in Figure 1, and then the three
regions speciﬁed in Proposition 5 arise.
A.2.2 As for consumers
1.e) (CSA)FTE >C S A∗ iﬀ
(46 + 441d +1 5 2 3 d2 + 3597d3 +2 5 0 5 d4 +9 4 4 d5 +1 4 7 d7)a2
−2(1 + d)2(2 + 3d)(3 + 6d + d2)(5 + 14d +7 d2)a




A(d) the lower and
















and verify that 0 <h
−
A(d) < ΦE(d) <h
+
A(d) < 1 for all d ∈ (0,1).
• Then (CSA)FTE >C S A∗ iﬀ a ∈ (h
+
A(d),1).
1.f) (CSB)FTE >C S B∗ iﬀ
(1 + d)2(2 + 3d)(3 + 6d + d2)2a2
−2(1 + d)2(2 + 3d)(3 + 6d + d2)(5 + 14d +7 d2)a


























B(d) for all d ∈ (0,1).
32• Then (CSB)FTE >C S B∗ for all a,d ∈ (0,1).
A.2.3 Each country’s total welfare
1.g) (SWA)FTE > (SWA)∗ iﬀ Aa2 −Ba +C>0.
Where,
A ≡ (34 + 255d +7 0 5 d2 +8 3 7 d3 +3 0 3 d4 − 161d5 − 148d6 − 33d7) > 0,
B ≡ 2(1 + d)2(3 + 6d + d2)(6 + 15d +4 d2 +1 5 d3) > 0,
C ≡ (1 + d)2(3 + 6d + d2)(10 + 49d +8 0 d2 +3 9 d3) > 0.
It happens that the lower and the greater roots of the above convex polynomial
do not exist since the discriminant is negative. That is,
sign(B2−4AC)=sign(−58−173d−106d2+49d3+42d4) < 0 for all d ∈ (0,1).
• Then (SWA)FTE > (SWA)∗ for all a,d ∈ (0,1).
1.h) (SWB)FTE > (SWB)∗ iﬀ Ca2 −Ba +A>0. Where A,B and C are the
same as in item 1.g).
It happens that the lower and the greater roots of the above convex polynomial do
not exist since the discriminant is negative. It coincides with the one corresponding
to item 1.g).
• Then (SWB)FTE > (SWB)∗ for all a,d ∈ (0,1).
A.3 Autarky vs. Free Trade without Exclusivity. Notation
and Complete Characterization of the Agents’ Incen-
tives to Trade Liberalization
As before we ﬁr s tc o m p u t et h ec o n s t r a i n to na such that the equilibrium price is
on the lower branch of the aggregate inverse demand. The constraint comes from
pFTN
i ≤ aA and reads ΦN(d) ≤ a ≤ 1, where ΦN(d)=2−d
4+d and is a decreasing
function of d ranging from 1
2 to 1
5.
A.3.1 Firms’ Gains from Free Trade
2.a) (MA)FTN >M A∗ implies that the small country manufacturers beneﬁts from
free trade. (MA)FTN >M A∗ iﬀ 2(1+d−d2 −d3)+4(1+d−d2 −d3)a−(1+7d+




A(d) the lower and the greater roots of the














It happens that s
−
A(d) < 0 < 1 <s
+
A(d) when 0 <d<0.589; while s
−
A(d) < 0 <
s
+
A(d) < 1 for 0.589 <d<1.
• Then we conclude that (MA)FTN >M A∗ either if a ∈ (0,1) when 0 <d<
0.589 or if s
−
A(d) < 0 <a<s
+
A(d) < 1 when 0.589 <d<1.
2.b) (MB)FTN >M B∗ iﬀ −(1 + 7d +2 d2 +2 d3)2 +4 ( 1+d − d2 − d3)a +2 ( 1+




B(d) the lower and the greater roots of














It happens that s
−
B(d) < 0 <s
+
B(d) < 1 for 0 <d<1.
• Then we conclude that (MB)FTN >M B∗ iﬀ a ∈ (s
+
B(d),1).





A(d) the lower and the greater roots of the above concave














It happens that t
−
A(d) < 0 < 1 <t
+
A(d) for all d ∈ (0,1).
• Then (RA)FTE >R A∗ for all a ∈ (0,1).





B(d) the lower and the greater roots of the above convex














It happens that t
−
B(d) < 0 <t
+
B(d) < 1 for all d ∈ (0,1).
• Then (RA)FTE >R A∗ if a ∈ (t
+
B(d),1).
Next we construct the ranking of the four thresholds on a deﬁned above. It is




































B(d) if 0.995 <d<1.
Combining the above items we provide the complete characterization of the four
agents incentive to trade liberalization in the d × a parameter space.
Proposition 8 i) Consider 0 <d≤ 0.2 then




B(d) < 1 then only the agents of the small country beneﬁt
from free trade;




B(d) < 1 then the retailer of the large country is the unique
agent not beneﬁting from free trade;




B(d) <a<1 then all agents (manufacturers and retailers)
beneﬁt from free trade.
ii) Consider 0.2 <d≤ 0.589 then




B(d) ≤ 1 then only the agents of the small country beneﬁt
from free trade;




B(d) ≤ 1 then the manufacturer of the large country is the
unique agent not beneﬁting from free trade;




B(d) <a≤ 1 then all agents (manufacturers and retailers)
beneﬁt from free trade.
iii) Consider 0.589 <d≤ 0.995 then




A(d) ≤ 1 then only the agents of the small country beneﬁt
from free trade;




A(d) < 1 then the manufacturer of the large country is the
unique agent not beneﬁting from free trade;




A(d) <a<1 then only retailers beneﬁt from free trade.
iv) Consider 0.995 <d<1 then




B(d) ≤ 1 then only the agents of the small country beneﬁt
from free trade;




B(d) < 1 then the retailer of the small country is the
unique agent beneﬁting from free trade;




B(d) <a<1 then only retailers beneﬁt from free trade.





B(d) < ΦN(d) when 0.995 <d<1. The other three rankings in
Proposition 6 are not ruled out.
35A.3.2 As for consumers
2.e) (CSA)FTN >C S A∗ iﬀ
16(119 + 266d +1 8 3 d2 +8 0 d3 +8 d4)a2
−256(1 + d)2(2 − d)(4 + d)a




A(d) the lower and the greater















and verify that 0 <v
−
A(d) < ΦN(d) <v
+
A(d) < 1 for all d ∈ (0,1).
• Then (CSA)FTN >C S A∗ iﬀ a ∈ (v
+
A(d),1).
2.f) (CSB)FTN >C S B∗ iﬀ
128(1 + d)2(2 − d)2a2 − 256(1 + d)2(2 − d)(4 + d)a
























B(d) for all d ∈ (0,1).
• Then (CSB)FTN >C S B∗ for all a,d ∈ (0,1).
A.3.3 Each country’s total welfare
2.g) (SWA)FTN > (SWA)∗ iﬀ A0a2 −B0a +C0 > 0.
Where,
A0 ≡ (97 + 64d − 339d2 − 278d3 − 56d4 − 48d5 Q 0,
B0 ≡ 16(1 + d)2(2 − d)(2 − 7d − 6d2),
C0 ≡ 8(1 + d)2(2 − d)(4 + 7d +6 d2) > 0.
It happens that A0 > 0 if d ∈ (0,0.508) and negative otherwise. It also happens
t h a tt h ed i s c r i m i n a n ti sn e g a t i v ef o rd ∈ (0,0.468). Then, for d ∈ (0,0.468) the lower
and the greater roots of the convex polynomial do not exist and we conclude that
(SWA)FTE > (SWA)∗ for all a if d ∈ (0,0.468).I nc a s eo fd ∈ (0.468,0.508) the















36It is easy to show that both roots are negative for d ∈ (0.468,0.508), and thus
we conclude that (SWA)FTE > (SWA)∗ for all a if d ∈ (0.468,0.508).
Finally, for d ∈ (0.508,1) the polynomial is concave and it happens that W
N−
A (d) <
0 < 1 <W
N+
A (d) with the conclusion of (SWA)FTE > (SWA)∗ for all a if
d ∈ (0.508,1).
• Putting all the reasoning together, (SWA)FTN > (SWA)∗ for all a,d ∈ (0,1).
2.h) (SWB)FTE > (SWB)∗ iﬀ C0a2 −B0a +A0 > 0. Where A0,B0 and C0 are the
same as in the 2.g) item.
It happens that the discriminant is negative for d ∈ (0,0.468). Then, for d ∈
(0,0.468) the lower and the greater roots of the convex polynomial do not exist
and we conclude that (SWA)FTE > (SWA)∗ for all a if d ∈ (0,0.468).D e n o t eb y
W
N−
B (d) and W
N+
B (d) the lower and the greater roots of the above convex polynomial















They verify that W
N−
B (d) < 0, and W
N+
B (d) < 0 for d ∈ (0.468,0.508) while
0 <W
N+
B (d) < 1 for d ∈ (0.508,1).
• Then
a)(SWB)FTN > (SWB)∗ for all a, if d ∈ (0,0.508);
b)(SWB)FTN > (SWB)∗ for all W
N+
B (d) <a<1 if d ∈ (0.508,1);
c)(SWB)FTN > (SWB)∗ for all 0 <a<W
N+
B (d) if d ∈ (0.508,1).
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